
Recent investigations into Brazil’s most powerful criminal organisation, the Primeiro Comando da Capital (PCC) , reveal a glaring weakness in global anti–money laundering systems as even highly visible, publicly accused criminal actors appear to have built legitimate corporate footprints in the United States.

Canada has released its second annual report under the Fighting Against Forced Labour and Child Labour in Supply Chains Act , covering the 2025 reporting cycle. The results provide an important barometer of corporate preparedness for human rights due diligence, and a clear signal for organisations operating globally.

The October 2025 investigation by The Sentry into Sudan’s Rapid Support Forces (RSF) exposed a sophisticated business ecosystem that stretches from Darfur’s gold mines to company registers in Dubai. Far from being an informal smuggling chain, the network resembled a distributed corporate structure — populated by real directors, legitimate-looking licences, and adaptive ownership. It demonstrates how paramilitary power in the 2020s relies less on weapons or ideology, and more on access to global markets and the ability to conceal that access through data-visible intermediaries.

Sanctions lists are one of the most common tools in compliance and due diligence. They flag people, companies, vessels, and states that governments or international bodies restrict. Checking names against these lists is often the first step in risk screening. But relying on them alone creates blind spots.

Illicit flows are not confined to shadowy corners of the global economy. They move through financial systems, supply chains, and markets every day , often hidden in plain sight. These flows — whether of money, minerals, labor, or weapons — undermine governance, and create serious risks for companies. Illicit flows thrive where evidence is weak. Without reliable, verifiable data, decisions on suppliers, partners, and deals carry hidden exposures that can translate into compliance failures, reputational damage, or financial loss.

Since Myanmar’s 2021 coup, the Thai–Myanmar frontier has morphed into one of the world’s densest clusters of industrial-scale cyber-fraud “compounds.” Run largely by Chinese-linked transnational syndicates and shielded by junta-aligned militias, these sites have doubled in number since the coup and now hold tens of thousands of trafficked workers.

Europe’s gas portfolios have been rewired since 2022. The International Energy Agency expects Europe’s LNG imports to hit a record in 2025 as pipeline flows from Russia keep shrinking, cementing LNG’s role in diversification strategies for the rest of the decade. Within this context, Africa appears as a valuable partner. Algeria is the continent’s largest natural-gas producer based on 2024 output, while Nigeria holds the biggest proven reserves. At the same time, Egypt, Senegal, Mauritania and Mozambique add flexible seaborne volumes that can swing between Atlantic and Asian basins.



