How transnational crime & a military junta built a cyber-fraud engine in Myanmar
Since Myanmar’s 2021 coup, the Thai–Myanmar frontier has morphed into one of the world’s densest clusters of industrial-scale cyber-fraud “compounds.”
Run largely by Chinese-linked transnational syndicates and shielded by junta-aligned militias, these sites have doubled in number since the coup and now hold tens of thousands of trafficked workers.
Myanmar, formerly known as Burma, has been ruled on and off by the military for most of its modern history.
In February 2021, the armed forces, known as the Tatmadaw, staged a coup against the elected civilian government led by Aung San Suu Kyi and her National League for Democracy, annulling the results of the 2020 election. The generals installed the State Administration Council (SAC) under Senior General Min Aung Hlaing, returning the country to outright military rule. Isolated internationally and under Western sanctions, the junta has struggled to fund itself.
To sustain its war effort, it relies heavily on allied militias that raise their own money through illicit economies. These include narcotics, illegal logging and jade trade, and, increasingly,
the cyber-fraud compounds that line the Thai–Myanmar border.
The growth of these “scam cities” is therefore part of the survival strategy of a dictatorship fighting to retain power.
The criminal architecture
The operational core of these scam compounds consists of transnational crime groups, often Chinese-run, that migrated from casino hubs such as Cambodia’s Sihanoukville and repurposed half-built resort or casino projects into cyber-fraud factories inside Myanmar.
Flagship hubs include Shwe Kokko (Yatai New City), KK Park, Taichang Park, and the Dongmei zone along the Moei/Thaungyin River opposite Thailand’s Tak Province.
The compounds function as employer-captive call centres: coerced workers cultivate trust online in long-con “pig-butchering” schemes, push fake investment and crypto plays, and launder proceeds through underground banking and exchanges. When under pressure, operators “sell” workers between compounds or extort families for ransoms.
Open-source phone-location analysis in 2024–25 reveals repeated device movements across KK Park, Dongmei, and Yatai, as well as frequent appearances in Naypyidaw, suggesting coordination and/or protection at senior levels.
The militia shield
The State Administration Council (SAC) is continuously facing territorial losses, sanctions, and shrinking revenues.
Rather than dismantle scam hubs, it relies on proxy militias that both fight its wars and self-fund via the compounds. Analysts characterise the scam economy as an existential prop for the regime’s war footing.
The Karen Border Guard Force (KBGF), led by Colonel Saw Chit Thu, controls much of the Shwe Kokko/Myawaddy corridor, leasing land, providing security, and selling power and internet to compounds.
Other Karen factions, including the DKBA, have profited or provided protection in parts of the corridor; anti-junta Karen forces (KNU/KNLA) have, by contrast, attacked or dismantled hubs where they gain control.
Traces of money and movement reinforce this arrangement: multiple devices circulate among compounds and into government sites, pointing to profit-sharing and coordination between militia-run hubs and state structures.
Shwe Kokko operates as a militia–syndicate joint venture.
The BGF/KNA holds equity via Chit Linn Myaing and has overseen a sprawling build-out since 2017, now retaining core command and finance functions for multiple scam crews.
KK Park, Taichang and Dongmei have expanded rapidly since the coup, adding docks and informal crossings to Thailand. After Thailand cut grid links, compounds smuggled satellite internet (notably Starlink kits) and diesel to stay online.
Together, these enclaves function as self-contained towns for crime, with dormitories, clinics, warehouses, VIP housing, and staged luxury backdrops used to deceive victims on video calls.
Human trafficking on an industrial scale
Recruiters lure targets with job ads and agents. Chinese speakers and, increasingly, English speakers from East Africa have been the primary targets.
Many travel to Thailand only to have their passports seized and be ferried across the Moei River into Myanmar compounds. Once inside, they are forced into cybercrime under threat of electrocution, beatings, starvation, and sexual violence.
The UN has warned that hundreds of thousands have been trafficked into forced criminality across South-East Asia, with Myanmar a principal hub and a six-figure captive workforce.
Reporting in 2025 documents a surge of Kenyan, Ugandan and Ethiopian victims, reflecting syndicates’ pivot to English-language labour to target Westerners.
Rescues are complicated by weak consular presence and slow repatriation processes, which prolongs captivity and heightens the leverage of ransom schemes.
The global response
Sanctions and designations have accelerated since 2023. The United States, the United Kingdom and the European Union have targeted Saw Chit Thu, KNA/BGF entities and associated firms.
Furthermore, in 2025, the U.S. sanctioned a tranche of Shwe Kokko- and Cambodia-linked entities, citing double-digit billions in losses and mass trafficking. These measures raise costs and stigma, but key beneficiaries often sit beyond easy legal reach inside Myanmar.
On the border, Thailand has cut power and internet feeds, seized satellite kits, and—often at China’s urging—coordinated repatriations numbering in the thousands.
The compounds adapt with generators, satellite links and deeper relocation inside Myanmar’s interior. Persistence remains high because the model is modular, mobile and militia-protected; labour is replenished from new regions; financial rails include OTC crypto and informal banking; and the junta’s survival incentives are misaligned with eradication.
Mapping the hidden economy
To translate this picture into practical insights and identify risks through data, it is necessary to carry out:
- Local (Myanmar/Thai) source monitoring to verify sites, capture geo-tagged photos, note militia presence, and log river-dock movements.
- Link sites to militias and syndicate fronts via corporate records, beneficial owners, director/alias pivots, phone/domain clusters through network and ownership mapping.
- Trace cross-border movements, supply lines, diversion paths, and recruitment routes, overlaid on logistics corridors to pinpoint choke points and trigger early warnings.
Myanmar’s scam compounds are not just isolated criminal enclaves—they show how a military dictatorship under siege sustains itself through alliances with transnational crime.
The result is a system that traffics tens of thousands of people, defrauds victims worldwide, and pours illicit revenues back into the hands of militias and generals.
For companies and policymakers, the global reach of these scams—costing billions annually and exploiting supply chains, payment systems, and technology platforms—means the risks are not confined to Myanmar’s borders but pose compliance, security, and reputational challenges everywhere.
